Negligence -- Tort Liability of Public Employees by Lipton, R. I.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 23 | Number 3 Article 10
4-1-1945
Negligence -- Tort Liability of Public Employees
R. I. Lipton
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
R. I. Lipton, Negligence -- Tort Liability of Public Employees, 23 N.C. L. Rev. 270 (1945).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol23/iss3/10
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cision; but, considering the nebulous understanding which must be
generally assumed of a legal rule which has been the subject of such
foggy judicial treatment, it is not imagined that the change will have
any early appreciable effect on the foreclosure market. And this is the
more patently true where, as in the instant case, the creditor is himself
bidding in the security for the amount of the debt.
It has been noted that some of the cases were decided without re-
gard to any recitals of proper advertisement.31 It is not apparent what
would have been decided in the instant case without this supporting
factor. It might easily be held that a deed from a trustee even though
it contained no recital of due advertisement would be prima facie vi-
dence of a valid sale and conveyance. That would give the deed alone
all the force given in the instant case to a -deed with the. usual recitals,
and that is probably as far as we should go for the unusual conveyance
not reciting proper advertisement 8 2* Recitals do, however, add some
measure of conviction. They may sometimes be erroneous. But less
often will they be fraudulent because most trustees are not likely to
make deliberately false statements.
That belief may argue for putting the burden in case of proved
recitals back where it used to be in North Carolina, on the one dis-
puting them, thus in effect making the claim of improper advertising an
affirmative 'defense. Recognizing that this is a matter on which different
views are understandable, it is believed that is where the burden should
be even in case of a purchaser who was the secured creditor as was the
present plaintiff.
Negligence-Tort Liability of Public Employees
In a recent North Carolina case,' the defendants, employees of the
North Carolina State Highway Commission, were held subject to per-
sonal liability for their negligence in operating a road sweeper so as to
damage the goods of the plaintiff. Though three justices dissented as
to the question of the negligence of the defendants, only one justice dis-
sented as to the question of the immunity of the defendants because of
" Elkes v. Interstate Trustee Corp., 209 N. C. 832, 187 S. E. 572 (1936);
Brown v. Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S. E. 233 (1929); Cawfield v. Owens, 129
N. C. 286, 40 S. E. 62 (1901); Lunsford v. Speaks, 112 N. C. 608, 17 S. E. 430
(1893) ; Dewberry v. Bk. of Standing Rock, 227 Ala. 484, 150 So. 463 (1933) ;
Graham v. Fitts, 53 Miss. 307 (1876). Similar general statement as to presump-
tion of regularity in exercise of power of sale, Bachrach v. Washington United
Coop., - Md. - , 29 A. (2d) 822, 825 (1943).
"*Lunsford v. Speaks, supra, note 31, seems, however, to have given more
probative effect to a non-reciting deed than the present decision gives to one with
recitals. The same is probably true of several others of the cases cited in that
note. See also Arey Brick & Lbr. Co. v. Waggoner, 198 N. C. 221, 151 S. E. 193
(1930), where fraud was claimed.




It is the purpose of this note to discuss generally the personal liabil-
ity of a public officer or employee for negligence in the performance of
his duties to one injured thereby.
The generally established rule of law in North Carolina is that a
public officer charged with the performance of a governmental duty in-
volving discretion cannot be held for mere negligence with respect
thereto; but he is individually liable for a breach of such duty only
when he acts corruptly or with malice.8 However, in proper instances
a public officer may be held liable for breach of duty in the performance
of his ministerial duties where injury has ensued. In North Carolina
a public officer is not personally liable where the duty is ministerial in
character and of a public nature, imposed entirely for public benefit,
unless the statute creating the office expressly provides for such liabil-
ity;4 but if the duty imposed is one for the benefit of the individual
the officer may be liable though there be no statutory provision for
liability.5
While the law relative to the tort liability of public officers in North
Carolina is well established, there seems to be a -dearth of express
declarations of the court as to the tort liability of public employees.
No consideration of this question would be complete without first hav-
ing examined just what does constitute a "public officer." Perhaps the
leading case in North Carolina on this subject is Nissen v. City of
Winston-Salevi, wherein the court distinguished between "employee"
and "officer" by citing McQuillan 7 who quotes Judge Cooley: "The
officer is distinguished from the employee in the greater importance,
dignity and independence of his position; in being required to take an
Id. at 790, 32 S. E. (2d) at 598.
3 Wilkins v. Burton, 220 N. C. 13, 16 S. E. (2d) 406 (1941); Old Fort v.
Harmon, 219 N. C. 245, 13 S. E. (2d) 426 (1941) ; Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N.
C. 241, 13 S. E. (2d) 423 (1941) ; Moye v. McLawhorn, 208 N. C. 812, 182 S. E.
493 (1935); Carpenter v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E.
693 (1922) ; Spruill v. Davenport, 178 N. C. 364, 100 S. E. 527 (1919) ; Hipp v.
Ferrell, 173 N.- C. 167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917); Templeton v. Beard, 159 N. C. 63,
74 S. E. 735 (1912) ; Hannan v. Grizzard, 99 N. C. 161, 6 S. E. 93 (1888).
"Wilkins v. Burton, 220 N. C. 13, 16 S. E. (2d) 406 (1941); Old Fort v.
Harmon, 219 N. C. 241, 13 S. E. (2d) 423 (1941) (No individual liability where
the statute imposing the duties does not provide for personal liability.) ; Noland v.
Board of Trustees of Southern Pines School, 190 N. C. 250, 129 S. E. 577 (1925)
Carpenter v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693 (1922);
Hipp v. Ferrell, 173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917) (No individual liability where
duties are of a public nature and imposed entirely for public benefit.); Fore v.
Feimster, 171 N. C. 551, 88 S. E. 977, L. R. A. 1916F 481 (1916); Hudson v.
McArthur, 152 N. C. 445, 67 S. E. 995 (1910).
'See Hipp v. Ferrell, 173 N. C. 167, 170, 91 S. E. 831, 833 (1917) ; Hudson
v. McArthur, 152 N. C. 445, 450, 67 S. E. 995, 997 (1910). For Notes on Liabil-
ity of Public Officers in North Carolina, see (1935-36) 14 N. C. L. Rav. 307
(1941-42) 20 N. C. L. REv. 110.
6 206 N. C. 888, 175 S. E. 310 (1934).
72 McQuII.AN, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) p. 38.
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official oath, and perhaps give an official bond; in the liability to be
called to account as a public offender for misfeasance or nonfeasance in
office,s and usually, though not necessarily in the tenure of his posi-
tion."9 This statement represents the great weight of authority in the
United States.'0
From an examination of the statement of the court in the Nissen
case, quoted ante, there is no doubt but that the defendants in the prin-
cipal case are public employees, and not officers; this was even conceded
by the dissent of Justice Schenck."- From a further examination of the
above quotation (see italicized section) it seems that one of the pri-
mary distinctions between public employees and public officers is the
extent of their tort liability, with the inference that the public employee
is subject to a greater range of liability than an officer. In Meares v.
Wilmington' 2 the court says: "We think the plaintiff had her election
to sue the individuals who did the work or to sue the defendants as a
corporation, in which capacity they procured the work to be done, and
are liable for the damage done by their agent, under the rule respondeat
superior. * * * If the work be done according to the directions of the
superior, and the agent is sued and pays damage, he has his redress
against the superior; if the work is done contrary to the directions of
the superior, and the superior is sued and pays damage, he has his
redress against the agent." In the case of Lewis v. Hunter,'3 the plain-
tiff's intestate was hit and run over by an automobile driven by the
defendant Hunter. While the intestate was thus lying prostrate on the
street, the defendant Spear, driving a police car, ran over the intestate.
The defendant Spear was employed by the city to keep the police radio
in the automobile he was driving in good working order; and, at the
time of the accident, Spear was returning the car from his shop to the
city's garage after having repaired the radio. No issue was made as
to any immunity of Spear by or through the nature of his temporary
employment, and the judgment against Spear was allowed to stand on
appeal; but in reversing the judgment against the defendant Zity, the
8 Italics supplied.
Nissen v. City of Winston-Salem, 206 N. C. 888, 892, 175 S. E. 310, 312
(1934).
"0 Wetzel v. McNutt, 4 F. Supp. 233, 234 (S. D. Ind. 1933) ; Mason v. City of
Los Angeles, 13 Cal. App. 224, 20 P. (2d) 84, 86 (1933) ; Hudson v. Annear, 101
Cola. 550, 75 P. (2d) 587 (1938) ; Dade County v. State, 95 Fla. 465, 477, 116 So.
72, 76 (1928) ; Hyde v. Board of Comrs of Wells County, 209 Ind. 245, 255, 198
N. E. 333, 337 (1935); State ex rel. Wickens v. Clark, 208 Ind. 402, 408, 196
N. E. 234, 237 (1935) ; Bowden v. Cumberland County, 123 Me. 359, 366, 123 Atl.
166, 169 (1924) ; City of Baltimore v. Lyman, 92 Md. 591, 611, 48 At. 145, 146
(1901); State ex rel. Cameron v. Shannon, 133 Mo. 139, 164, 33 S. W. 1137,
1144 (1896).
1 Miller v. Jones, 224 N. C. 783, 790, 32 S. E. (2d) 594, 598 (1945).
1031 N C 73 79 (1848).
L212 N. C. F04, 193 S. E. 814 (1937).
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court said "... Spear was performing duties incident to the police
power of the city, whether he was engaged in repairing or testing the
radio or whether in returning the automobile to the police garage after
such repairing or testing, and everything that he did for the city with
the automobile in the scope of his employment14 was done as an inci-
dent to the police power of the city-a purely governmental function."' 5
In Carpenter v. R.R.'0 the'court said: ". . . we concede the proposition
that the immunity of the State from suit does not save its officers and
agents from liability for a trespass committed in breach of an individ-
ual's legal rights under conditions prohibited by law, even when they
act or assume to act by authority of the State."
From these cases it is evident that though North Carolina has never
actually -decided the proposition before, that the rule laid down by the
majority of the court in the principal case is clearly correct, and merely
reiterates the established rule of other jurisdictions-that an employee
of a municipality or state is personally liable to one injured by his




" Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N. C. 504, 509, 193 S. E. 814, 817 (1937).
10184 N. C. 400, 404, 114 S. E. 693, 695 (1922).
' Note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 1358.
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